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Abstract
Evidence from social psychology suggests that econometricians will avoid evidence that disconfirms
their beliefs. Two beliefs of econometricians were examined: (1) Econometric methods provide more
accurate short-term forecasts than do other methods; and (2) more complex econometric methods yield
more accurate forecasts. A survey of 21 experts in econometrics found that 95% agreed with the first
statement and 72% agreed with the second. A review of the published empirical evidence yielded little
support for either of the two statements in the 41 studies. The method of multiple hypotheses was
suggested as a research strategy that will lead to more effective use of disconfirming evidence. Although
this strategy was suggested in 1890, it has only recently been used by econometricians.
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Forecasting with
Econometric Methods:
Folklore versus Fact

Introduction

This paper is concerned with the use of
econometric methods for forecasting in the social
sciences. Although this is not the only use of
econometric methods, it is one of the ways they
are used; it is also the use that can most easily be
validated. The paper examines only the predictive validity of econometric models. The importance of predictive validity has long been recognized by econometricians. Christ (1951) stated,
"The ultimate test of an econometric model . . . comes with checking its predictions."
"Econometric methods" are defined in this
paper as quantitative approaches that attempt to
use causal relationships in forecasting. In particular, they refer to models based on regression
analysis. This definition conforms to common
usage of the term "econometric methods."
"Folklore" is used here to reflect what
econometricians believe, as judged by what they
do. "Fact" is based upon published empirical
studies.
The first part of this paper draws upon evidence from social psychology to explain why
folklore persists. Most of the evidence is based
upon the behavior of people in general. How* The Stockholm School of Economics provided time and
money for this project. Permission was granted by John
Wiley & Sons to include sections from Long-Range Forecasting: From Ciystal Ball to Computer (New York: WileyInterscience, 1978).
(Journal of Business, 1978, vol. 51, no. 4)
@ 1978 by The University of Chicago
002 1-939817815104-0006$01.30

Evidence from social
psychology suggests
that econometricians
will avoid evidence that
disconfirms their beliefs. Two beliefs of
econometricians were
examined: (1)
Econometric methods
provide more accurate
short-term forecasts
than do other methods;
and (2) more complex
econometric methods
yield more accurate
forecasts. A survey of
21 experts in econometrics found that 95%
agreed with the first
statement and 72%
agreed with the second.
A review of the published empirical evidence yielded little support for either of the two
statements in the 41
studies. The method of
multiple hypotheses
was suggested as a research strategy that will
lead to more effective
use of disconfirming
evidence. Although this
strategy was suggested
in 1890, it has only recently been used by
econometricians.
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ever, there is evidence to suggest that scientists act as other people
when testing their favored hypotheses.
Two examples of the discrepancy between folklore and fact are
provided in the second part of the paper. These are only two of a
number of possible examples, but they deal with two important questions. First, do econometric methods provide the most accurate way to
obtain short-range forecasts? Second, do complex econometric methods provide more accurate forecasts than simple econometric methods?
The third part of the paper describes the method of multiple hypotheses. This method should help to overcome folklore.
The Persistence of Folklore

Folklore persists because people who hold viewpoints on an issue tend
to perceive the world so as to reinforce what they already believe; they
look for "confirming" evidence and avoid "disconfirming" evidence.
There is much literature on this phenomenon, commonly known as
"selective perception."
The tendency for intelligent adults to avoid disconfirming evidence
was demonstrated by Wason (1960, 1968). He provided three numbers
(2, 4, 6) to subjects, and they were asked to determine what rule had
been used to generate the three numbers. In order to gain additional
information, the subjects were encouraged to generate other series of
three numbers. The experimenter provided feedback on whether or not
each new series was in agreement with the rule. What happened? The
typical subject would think of a rule and then generate series that were
consistent with that rule. It was unusual for a subject to try a series that
was inconsistent with his own rule. Subjects who were told that their
rules were incorrect were allowed to generate additional series. The
majority of these subjects maintained the same rule that they had
previously but stated it in different terms. (It is like magic; it will work
if one can pronounce it correctly!)
In cases where disconfirming evidence is thrust upon people, they
tend to remember incorrectly. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975), for example, found that subjects tended to remember their predictions differently if the outcome was in conflict with their prediction.
Wason's studies dealt with situations in which the person had no
stake and no prior emotional attachment. When one has invested effort
in supporting a particular viewpoint, the tendency to avoid disconfirming evidence would be expected to be stronger. The reward system in
science encourages researchers to devote their energies to one viewpoint. The scientist gains recognition by being an advocate of a particular approach or theory. In such a case, the scientist can be expected to
avoid disconfirming evidence.
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Studies of scientists indicate that they are biased in favor of their
own hypothesis. They interpret evidence so that it conforms to their
beliefs. For example, in Rosenthal and Fode (1963), experimenters
were provided with two equivalent samples of rats, but they were told
that one sample was gifted and the other was disadvantaged. In the
subsequent "scientific tests," the gifted rats learned tasks more
quickly than did the disadvantaged rats.
The above studies dealt with individuals rather than with groups.
What happens when group pressures are involved-for example, when
someone submits an article to be evaluated by his peers in the "marketplace of ideas?" What happens when learned societies, such as the
Econometric Society, are formed to promote the advancement of the
science? As the group pressures become stronger, one would expect
stronger efforts to avoid evidence that disconfirms the group's opinions. Substantial literature shows how group judgment distorts reality.
The study by Asch (1965) showed that most subjects would agree with
the group that a given line B was longer than another line A, even
though the reverse was obviously true.
In fact, the peer review process was studied in an experiment by
Mahoney (1977). A paper was sent to 75 reviewers. Some reviewers
received the paper along with results that were supportive of the
commonly accepted hypothesis in this group. Other reviewers received
a copy of the identical study except that the results were reversed so
that they disconfirmed the prevailing hypothesis. Reviewers with
confirming results thought the study was relevant and methodologically
sound. Reviewers with disconfirming results thought the study was not
relevant and that the methodology was poor. The confirming paper was
recommended for publication much more frequently.
The studies cited above provide only a portion of the evidence.
Other relevant studies include Pruitt (1961), Geller and Pitz (1968),
Chapman and Chapman (1969), Rosenthal and Rosnow (1969), and
Greenwald (1975). This evidence implies that scientists avoid disconfirming evidence. This tendency is stronger when the position is
adopted by a group.
It is not surprising then, that great innovations in science have often
met with resistance. (Barber [I9611 describes some important historical
examples.) There is little reason to expect that "modern science" is
different. For illustration, one might examine the treatment of Immanuel Velikovsky, a case that is being followed closely by
sociologists (de Grazia 1966). This treatment was not the result of a
lack of interest or a lack of time; rather it was an active attempt to
suppress Velikovsky's theories and to discredit him.
Social scientists are expected to be more prone to group opinion than
are physical scientists. Thus, they would experience serious difficulties
in adopting new findings. Are econometricians also resistant to innova-
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tions? In a critique of what is being done by econometricians, Bassie
(1972) implies that they are. He claims that econometricians display
much conformity to their preconceptions.
Two examples from econometrics are examined below. These
examples were selected because they represent an important part in the
life of an econometrician-and also because there seem to be discrepancies between folklore and fact. (Additional examples can be
found in Armstrong [1978a].)

Short-Range Forecasting

Most textbooks on econometrics discuss short-range forecasting. Although seldom stated, the implication is that econometric methods
provide more accurate short-range forecasts than other methods.
Brown (1970, p. 441) asserted that econometric models were originally
designed for short-range forecasting. Kosobud (1970, pp. 260-61), in a
paper on short-range forecasting, referred to " . . . the growing body
of evidence on the predictive value of econometric models." In a
review of a book on short-range economy-wide forecasting, Worswick
(1974, p. 118) said that "the value of econometric models in short-term
forecasting is now fairly generally recognized." Various econometric
services sell short-range forecasts, and one of their claims is improved
accuracy. The press publishes short-range forecasts from well-known
econornetric models with the implication that these models will provide
accurate forecasts.
Survey of Econometricians
In order to go beyond the indirect evidence cited in the preceding
paragraph, a questionnaire was mailed to experts in econometrics in
late 1975. The survey was based on a convenience sample. Of 56
questionnaires that were sent out, 21 were completed. An additional
eight were returned incomplete by respondents who said they lacked
the necessary expertise. Thus, replies were received from over 40% of
the experts. The respondents were from some of the leading schools in
econometrics-for example, M.I.T., Harvard, Wharton, Michigan
State-and from well-known organizations that sell econometric forecasts. Many of the respondents are recognized as leading econometricians. (A listing of the sample was provided to the editors of the Journal
of Business .)
The questionnaire asked, "Do econometric methods generally provide more accurate or less accurate forecasts than can be obtained
from competitive methods for short-term forecasting in the social sci-
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ences? Or is there no difference in accuracy?" A set of definitions was
also provided. '
The results of the survey, presented in table 1, were that 95% of the
experts agreed that predictions from econometric models are more
accurate.
Respondents were asked how much confidence they had in their
opinion on accuracy. Confidence was rated on a scale from 1 ("no
confidence") to 5 ("extremely confident"). (If the question was not
clear to respondents, they were instructed to report a low level of
confidence.) The average response was about 4. No one rated confidence lower than 3.0. Those who responded with "significantly more
accurate" had the highest confidence level.
Another question asked how the respondent would rate himself
. . . as an expert on applied econometrics." Eight respondents
rated themselves as "very much of an expert," six as "fairly expert,"
four as "somewhat of an expert," and two felt that they were "not
much of an expert" (there was one nonresponse on this question).
Those who rated themselves as more expert felt that econometric
methods were more accurate: Five of the eight who rated themselves as
"very much of an expert" felt that econometric methods were significantly more accurate, a rating that was significantly higher than the
ratings by the other respondents (P < .05 using the Fisher Exact Test).
'4

TABLE 1

Survey of Experts on Accuracy of Short-Range Econometric Predictions
(N = 21)

Econometric Predictions Rated

Percentage

Significantly more accurate
Somewhat more accurate
No difference (or undecided)
Somewhat less accurate
Significantly less accurate
1. These definitions were as follows: "(a) 'Econometric methods' include all methods
which forecast by explicitly measuring relationships between the dependent variable and
some causal variables. (b) 'Competitive methods' would include such things as judgment
by one or more 'experts' or extrapolation of the variable of interest (e.g., by relating the
variable to 'time' such as in autoregressive schemes). (c) By 'do,' we mean that
comparisons should be made between methods which appear to follow the best practices
which are available at the current time. In other words, the methods should each be
applied in a competent manner. (d) 'Short-term' refers to time periods during which
changes are relatively small. Thus, for forecasts of the economy, changes from year to
year are rather small, almost always less than 10%. For some situations, however,
one-year changes may be substantial. (e) 'Forecasts' refer to unconditional or 'ex ante'
forecasts only. That is, none of the methods shall use any data drawn from the situation
which is being forecast. Thus, for time series, only data prior to time t could be used in
making the forecasts. (f) The 'social sciences' would include economics, psychology,
sociology, management, etc. In short, any area where the behavior of people is involved."
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In general, the survey supported the anecdotal evidence. Experts are
confident that short-range econometric predictions are more accurate
than predictions from other methods.
Empirical Evidence
Turning to "fact," an examination was made of all published empirical
studies that I could find in the social sciences. This survey was conducted primarily by examining references from key articles and by
searching through journals. Respondents to the expert survey were
asked to cite evidence, but this yielded few rep lie^.^ Finally, early
drafts of this paper were presented at conferences and were circulated
for comments over a period of 4 years; this approach did lead to
additional studies. The studies are summarized below.
Christ (1951, 1956) provided disconfirming evidence on the accuracy
of econometric predictions. In the 1951 study, econometric forecasts
were better than "no change" forecasts on six occasions and worse on
four. These were conditional or ex post forecasts; nevertheless, the
results were not encouraging. The reaction to these findings was similar
to previously mentioned occasions when disconfirming evidence was
thrust upon scientists. Two of the discussants for Christ's paper were
Lawrence Klein and Milton Friedman. Klein, whose model had been
examined by Christ (1951, p. 121), stated that ". . . a competent
forecaster would have used an econometric model . . . far differently
and more efficiently than Christ used his model." Friedman, however,
was receptive. He said (Christ [1951], p. 112) that additional evidence
would tend to strengthen Christ's conclusion and that " . . . the
construction of additional models along the same general lines [as
Klein' s model] will, in due time, be judged failures. "
Additional evidence on the predictive validity of econometric methods since Christ's papers is described here. Most of these studies are
recent. Some are only of a suggestive nature because they compare ex
post predictions of econometric models with ex ante predictions from
alternative methods. Comparisons between extrapolations and ex post
econometric forecasts were made by Kosobud (1970), Cooper (1972),
Nelson (1972), Elliott (1973), Granger and Newbold (1974), Narasimham, Castellino, and Singpurwalla (1974), Levenbach, Cleary, and
Fryk (1974), and Ibrahim and Otsuki (1976).3 Extrapolations provided better forecasts than the econometric methods in all studies
2. Two of the respondents who rated themselves highly as experts and who had the
highest confidence in their ratings stated that they were not aware of any empirical
evidence on this issue.
3. One of these papers (Cooper 1972) had econometricians as discussants. The discussion was emotional and much effort was given to showing how the econometric forecasts
might have been revised to yield a more favorable comparison. No attempt was made to
show how the extrapolations might have been improved.
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except Kosobud's and Levenbach's. In Levenbach's, there was a tie
for the 1-year forecast, and the econometric model was better for the
2-year forecast. None of these eight studies claimed to find a statistically significant difference. A comparison between ex post econometric forecasts and judgmental forecasts was carried out by Kosobud
(1970); Fair (1971); Haitovsky, Treyz, and Su (1974); and Rippe and
Wilkinson (1974). Although the econometric forecasts were superior in
all but Rippe and Wilkinson, none of these studies reported on statistical significance. However, sufficient data were provided in the Rippe
and Wilkinson study to allow for such a test; my analysis of their
results indicated that the econometric forecasts were significantly
poorer than the judgmental forecasts. Thus, the analyses of 13 ex post
studies with 14 comparisons did not provide evidence that econometric methods were superior.
To obtain direct evidence on the short-range predictive validity of
econometric methods, a review was made of studies involving ex ante
or unconditional forecasts. To qualify for inclusion, a study must have
compared econometric and alternative methods where each was carried out in a competent manner. The question of when a method was
competently applied created some difficulty. The major effect of this
restriction was to rule out studies where the alternative model was a
"no-change" extrapolation. Some studies were retained (e.g., Ash and
Smyth 1973), although the alternative models could have been improved.
In all, 12 studies involving 16 comparisons were found. These studies
are summarized in table 2. The criteria were taken from each stud< In
other words, they were the most appropriate criteria in the opinion of
the researchers who did each study. Efforts were made to test for
statistical significance where this had not been done in the published
study. In general, serious difficulties were encountered; most of these
studies did not provide sufficient data (e.g., Naylor, Seaks, and Wichern 1972), others failed to use comparable time periods, and still
others sufferedfrom small sample sizes. The most striking result was that
not one study was found where the econometric method was signijicantly more accurate. Nor did the econometric method show any
general superiority: Six comparisons showed the econometric method
to be superior, three suggested no difference, and seven found that it
was inferior.
To guard against biases that may have been held by the author and to
ensure that this study could be replicated, two research assistants
coded a sample of three studies. The coding was done independently
(i.e., the coders did not meet each other) and it was done blindly (i.e.,
the coders were not aware of the hypotheses in this study). In each of
the four comparisons from these studies (Vand6me 1963; Markland

TABLE 2

Accuracy of Econometric Methods for Short-Term Forecasting
01

Relative
Accuracy of
Econometric
Methods
Significantly
more accurate (P <
.05)
More accurate

No difference

Source
of
Evidence

Significantly
less accurate
(P < .05)

Alternative
Forecasting
Method

Test of
Statistical
Significance

...

...

...

Sims (1967)
Ash and Smyth (1973)
McNees (1974)
McNees (1974)
Haitovsky et al. (1974, table
7.3)
Christ (1975)
Sims (1967)

Dutch economic indicators
U.K. economic indicators
U.S. economic indicators
U.S. economic indicators
U.S. economic indicators

Extrapolation
Extrapolation
Extrapolation
Judgmental
Judgmental

RMSE
Theil's U
RMSE
RMSE
Average absolute error

None
None
None
None
None

U.S. economic indicators
Norwegian economic indicators
Norwegian economic indicators
U.S. economic indicators
U.K. economic indicators
U.K. economic indicators
U.S. economic indicators
U.S. economic indicators
U.S. economic indicators
Nonresidential investment

Extrapolation
Extrapolation

RMSE
RMSE

None
None

Extrapolation

(Five criteria used)

None

Judgmental
Judgmental
Extrapolation
Extrapolation
Judgmental
Extrapolation
Judgmental

RMSE
Percentage changes
MAPE
Average absolute error
Theil's U
RMSEITheil's U
MAPE

None
None
Armstrong*
None
None
Armstrong*
None

Inventory control

Extrapolation

Coefficient of variation

Ridker (1963)

Less accurate

Forecast
Situation

rn
01

Criteria for Accuracy
(RMSE = root mean
square error;
MAPE = mean
absolute percentage error)

Christ (1975)
Vandome (1963)
Vandome (1963)
Naylor et al. (1972)
McNees (1975)
Cooper and Nelson (1975)
Liebling, Bidwell, and Hall
( 1976)

Markland (1970)

*Details on these tests can be obtained from Scott Armstrong, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
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1970; Naylor et al. 1972) there was perfect agreement among the author
and the two raters. In addition, five of the ex post prediction studies
were coded (Kosobud 1970; Fair 1971; Cooper 1972; Elliott 1973;
Granger and Newbold 1974). The only exception to perfect agreement
occurred when one of the coders classified the econometric models as
superior to extrapolation in Granger and Newbold. The agreement
between the two raters and me on eight out of nine comparisons
provides evidence that the ratings were reliable. (A copy of the instructions to the coders can be obtained from the author.)
The 16 comparisons of predictive validity were in agreement with the
14 ex post comparisons. Econometric forecasts were not found to be
more accurate .4

Simple versus Complex Econometric Methods

"Progress" in econometric methods appears to be reflected by an
increase in complexity in the methods used to analyze data. Leser
(1968) noted long-term tendencies toward the use of more variables,
more equations, more complex functional forms, and more complex
interactions among the variables in econometric models. This increase
in complexity can be observed by examining various issues of
Econornetrica since 1933 or by examining textbooks. The inference is
that, because more complex procedures provide more realistic ways to
represent the real world, they should yield more accurate forecasts.
Some researchers imply that complexity will lead to greater accuracy. For example, Suits (1962, p. 105) states " . . . clearly the fewer
the equations the greater must be the level of aggregation and the less
accurate and useful the result." Of course, not all econometricians
believe this. Bassie (1958, p. 81) proposed a general rule, "the more a
function is complicated by additional variables or by nonlinear relationships, the surer it is to make a good fit with past data and the surer
it is to go wrong sometime in the future."
4. These results do not imply that econometric methods are of no value in short-range
forecasting. A number of studies (e.g., Granger and Newbold [I9741 and Cooper and
Nelson [1975]) suggest that econometric forecasts can be combined with other types of
forecasts to yield forecasts that are superior to any one of the components. Econometric
methods are also valuable because they provide greater accuracy in long-range economic
forecasting. Three studies on long-range forecasting met the criteria stated for table 2
(O'Herlihy et al. 1967; Armstrong 1968; Armstrong and Grohman 1972). Econometric
methods were superior to other methods in each study. Furthermore, the relative
superiority of the econometric method increased as the forecast horizon increased in two
studies (Armstrong and Grohman 1972; Christ 1975). This finding conflicts with the
viewpoints of many econometricians, however. For example, Wold (quoted as a discussant in NATO [1967], p. 48) implied that econometric methods are more appropriate
for short-range than long-range forecasting because "the longer the forecast span, the
more the actual course of events will be affected by minor influencing factors that are
too numerous to be taken into account in a causal model."
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Survey of Econometricians

To gain further information on whether experts believe that increased
complexity in econometric models leads to more accurate forecasts,
my previously mentioned mail survey asked: "Do complex methods
generally provide more accurate or less accurate forecasts than can be
obtained from less complex econometric methods for forecasting in the
social sciences?--or is there no difference in a c ~ u r a c y ? "As
~ shown in
table 3, there was substantial agreement on the value of complexity;
72% of the experts agreed and only 9% disagreed. The experts were
confident in their ratings on the value of complexity. The average
confidence level was 4.0 (where 5 = "extremely confident").
Many factors could affect the relationship between complexity and
accuracy. For example, Schmidt (1971), working with psychological
data, found simple unit weights to be superior to regression weights for
small sample sizes where there were many predictors. Furthermore,
the relationship may not be a linear one; that is, complexity up to a
modest level might be desirable, and beyond that it could be undesirable.
A specific question asked the experts to make any qualifications they
felt important in assessing the relationship. Most respondents did qualify their answers, but it was difficult to find factors that were mentioned
by more than one person.
Empirical Evidence

To assess the value of complexity in econometric methods, an examination was made of all published empirical evidence that I could find in
the social sciences. Some studies provided indirect evidence on the
value of complexity. McLaughlin (1973) examined the accuracy of
forecasts from 12 econometric services in the United States. These
forecasts were made by models that differed substantially in complexTABLE 3

Survey of Experts on Complexity and Accuracy (N = 21)

Complex Methods Rated

Percentage

Significantly more accurate
Somewhat more accurate
No difference (or undecided)
Somewhat less accurate
Significantly less accurate
5. The definitions were the same as provided in the footnote 1. Complexity was
defined as follows: " 'Complexity' is to be thought of as an index reflecting the methods
used to develop the forecasting model: (1) the use of coefficients other than 0 or 1 (2) the
number of variables (more variables being more complex) (3) the functional relationship
(additive being less complex than multiplicative; nonlinear more complex than linear) (4)
the number of equations (5) whether the equations involve simultaneity."
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ity (although all were complex). There were no reliable differences in
accuracy among these models: The rankings of accuracy for the models
in 1971 were negatively correlated (0.6 Spearman rank correlation)
with those for 1972. If there are no reliable differences, then no differences would be found between accuracy and complexity. I
reanalyzed data from the study by Jorgenson, Hunter, and Nadiri
(1970) and found a perfect negative correlation between complexity of
the four models (ranked by the number of variables in the model) and
the stability of the regression coefficients from one period to the next
(ranked by Jorgenson et al.); this lack of stability for more complex
methods would suggest a loss in predictive validity. Friend and Taubman (1964) asserted their simple model was superior to more complex
models (unfortunately they did not include the data from their study
and, furthermore, the study only examined ex post predictive validity).
Fair (1971) found little difference between his simple model and the
more complex Wharton model in a test of ex post predictive validity.
Direct evidence on the value of complexity was sought by using only
studies with ex ante forecasts. Each of the models, whether simple or
complex, was done in a competent manner. The results of this literature survey are summarized in table 4.
To determine whether the coding of the studies in table 4 was
reliable, eight of the 11 studies (all but Johnston and McNeal [1964],
Grant and Bray [1970], and McNees [1974]) were independently coded
by two research assistants. The coding was blind in that the assistants
were unaware of the hypotheses. Discrepancies were noted on only
two of these studies; one assistant coded Dawes and Corrigan (1974) to
show that more complex methods were superior, and the other assistant reported complexity to be superior in Wesman and Bennett (1959).
The studies in table 4 suggest that complexity and accuracy are not
closely related. No study reported a significant positive relationship
between complexity and accuracy. Overall, seven comparisons favored less complexity and four favored more complexity.
The 11 studies that assessed predictive validity directly were in
agreement with the five studies that provided indirect evidence: Added
complexity did not yield improvements in accuracy. The empirical
evidence does not support the folklore in this area.
Multiple Hypotheses: An Alternative Research Strategy

The first part of this paper suggested that econometricians often act as
advocates; they attempt to find evidence to support their viewpoint.
Furthermore, group opinion is often used to judge truth. Under such
conditions, it is likely that beliefs will persist even if unsupported by
empirical evidence.

TABLE 4

Accuracy of Simple vs. Complex Methods
--

Relative
Accuracy of
Complex
Methods
Significantly
more accurate (P <
.05)
More accurate

No difference
Less accurate

Source
of
Evidence

Criterion
for
Accuracy

Nature
of
Comparison

Test of
Statistical
Significance

...

...

...

...

...

Stuckert (1958)

Academic performance

Percent correct

None

McNees (1974)

GNP

Grant and Bray (1970)

Personnel

Theil coefficient; RMSE,
mean absolute error
Correlation coefficient

Unit weights vs. regression
Small vs. large models

Johnston and McNeal
( 1964)

Medicine

Correlation coefficient

Unit weights vs. regression
Unit weights vs. regression

Armstrong*
Authors

...

...

...

...

Dawes and Conigan
( 1974)

Academic performance,
simulated data,
psychiatric ratings
Academic performance

Correlation coefficient

Unit weights vs. regression

Armstrong*

Percent correct

None

Criminology

Percent correct

Academic performance

Correlation coefficient

Unit weights vs. regression
Few vs. many causal vanables
Unit weight vs. regression

Personnel selection

Percent correct, correlation coefficient

Unit weights vs. regression

Wesman and Bennett
(1959)
Scott and Johnson (1967)

01
m
0

None

...

Lawshe and Schucker
(1959)
Reiss (1951)

Significantly
less accurate
(P < .05)

Forecast
Situation

-

None
None
4

None

5

E

%
Claudy (1972)
Summers and Stewart
( 1968)

Simulated data (typical of
psychological data)
Political judgments

Correlation coefficient
Correlation coefficients

*Details on these tests can be obtained from Scott Armstrong, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

Unit weights vs. regression
Linear vs. nonlinear models

Armstrong*

g.F

3
Armstrong*
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An alternative to the use of advocacy is to adopt the method of
multiple hypotheses (Chamberlin [I8901 1965; Platt 1964). Here, each
scientist examines two or more reasonable hypotheses (or methods) at
the same time. The role of the scientist is to determine which of the
methods is most useful in the given situation. When two or more
reasonable hypotheses are studied, it is less likely that the scientist will
feel a bias in favor of "his" hypothesis-they are all "his" hypotheses.
The orientation of the scientist is changed from one where he seeks to
confirm a hypothesis to one where he seeks to disconfirm one or more
hypotheses. Because the various hypotheses are tested within each
study, there is less need to rely upon the opinions of other experts. The
method of multiple hypotheses should help researchers to make more
effective use of disconfirming evidence.
Although the method of multiple hypotheses would appear to be less
prone to selective perception, and thus superior to the use of advocacy,
surprisingly little evidence is available on this issue. This evidence,
summarized in Armstrong (1978b), provides modest support for multiple hypotheses over advocacy. Most surprising again was the lack of
evidence to support advocacy, the research strategy that appears to be
most common among social scientists.
Conclusions

Certain hypotheses about econometric methods have been accepted
for years despite the lack of evidence. Ninety-five percent of the
experts agreed that econometric methods are superior for short-range
forecasting. An examination of the empirical literature did not support
this belief: Econometric forecasts were not shown to be significantly
better in any of the 14 ex post and 16 ex ante tests. Furthermore, there
was no tendency toward greater accuracy over these 30 tests. Similarly, 72% of the experts felt that complexity contributed to accuracy,
but the examination of the literature did not support such a belief:
Complex models were not significantly better in any of the five indirect
and 11 direct tests.
Thrusting disconfirming evidence upon others provides an ineffective way of changing attitudes. Econometricians are more likely to be
convinced by their own studies. The use of the method of multiple
hypotheses provides a rational way for econometricians to test their
beliefs.
In one sense the situation is encouraging. Twenty-three studies using
the method of multiple hypotheses were found (see tables 2 and 4).
These studies are becoming more common; the oldest study was published in 1951 and almost half were published since 1970. This trend in
research strategy should be useful in distinguishing folklore from fact.
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